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NOTES AND COMMENTS

selling to its franchise dealers. The Commission had found the operation
of the franchise plan to be akin to the operation of tying clauses that are
generally held to be inherently anti-competitive.
In the Atlantic case, the Commission took a step toward the position
that franchise agreements are inherently illegal. In Firestone Tire and
Rubber Co."9 , the Commission staff attempted to take another step. They
sought an order restraining Shell Oil Company from using a sales-commission plan, a purchase-resale plan, or any other plan for distribution of
TBA directly or indirectly to its dealers. However, the Commission entered
an order similar to the Atlantic-Goodyear order which enjoined the use
of a sales-commission plan. The Commission took the final step when it
adopted the position that Brown Shoe's franchise plan is in itself illegal.
The Eighth Circuit rejected this position but it is important to note that
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari. 20 Perhaps the Supreme Court's
decision in the Brown Shoe case will reveal what the Atlantic decision
does not; namely, the degree of control, if any, that a large concern can
exercise over its dealers without running afoul of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
Cecil T. Beeson

TRUSTS: THE DISCRETIONARY TRUST IN OKLAHOMA
In the recent case of First National Bank of Enid v. Clark,' the
plaintiff (defendant in error on appeal) was the former wife of the beneficiary under a discretionary trust. In July, 1961, the plaintiff filed an
application for citation in the Superior Court of Garfield County seeking
to have the beneficiary punished for contempt for failure to make child
support payments. The trustee bank (plaintiff in error on appeal) was not
made a party to this action. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. In
February, 1962, the plaintiff filed suit in the District Court of Garfield
County against the defendant bank seeking to compel the bank, as trustee
of the trust created in the will of the beneficiary's mother, to satisfy the
judgment obtained by the plaintiff against the beneficiary. This suit would
further compel the bank as trustee to pay the sum of $60.00 monthly for
the support of the children.
The trial court entered judgment requiring the defendant bank as
trustee to pay the judgment obtained by the plaintiff and to pay the
monthly support for the two minor children. The defendant bank perfected an appeal therefrom.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma decided that to the extent the
judgment appealed from requires the trustee to pay over the "income"
19 58 F.T.C. 371 (1961).
20 Cert. granted, 34 U.S.L. WBEK 3003 (No. 1141, 1964 Term; renumbered

No. 118, 1965 Term).
1 402 P.2d 248 (Okla. 1965).
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from the trust estate to the payment of the judgment for child support
and the order for child support, it is vacated and set aside, but to the
extent that the trial court's judgment requires the trustee to pay over to
the plaintiff, or guardian, any income which the trustee determines shall
be paid to or for the beneficiary, the judgment is affirmed.
The principal case seems to be a case of first impression in Oklahoma and is unique as it was the first time that the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma had ruled on the effects of a discretionary trust. The Supreme
Court, in reaching its decision, recognized the distinction between a discretionary trust and a spendthrift trust.
The rules applicable to a discretionary trust are well settled in most
jurisdictions. 2 If a trustee has the discretion whether to pay or apply income to or for a beneficiary, or to pay or apply nothing, the interest of
the benficiary before the trustee elects to pay or apply a given amount
is not assignable nor reachable by his creditors. In a discretionary trust,
it is the nature of the beneficiary's interest, rather than a provision forbidding alienation, which prevents the transfer of the beneficiary's interest. The transferee, or creditor, cannot compel the trustee to pay anything
to him since even the beneficiary cannot demand receipt of the proceeds
for application for his own benefit 3 Recognizing the nature of a discretionary trust and that the beneficiary has no vested interest until he has
received something from the trustee, the courts with uniformity have
determined that such trusts are not subject to invasion by caimants against
the beneficiary. This is because no vested interest can be established in the
beneficiary under a discretionary trust until the trustee first exercises its
discretionary powers and makes a decision as to what proceeds the beneficiary shall have from the trust estate.4
In the First National case, the theory was advanced that the Oklahoma Legislature had seen fit to codify public policy and had created a
statutory exemption from the rule of non-liability of a discretionary trust.
This contention was based on Section 175.25 (A) of Title 60, Oklahoma
Statutes (1961). 5 However, this conclusion cannot be advanced logically
if consideration is given to Section 175.25 (E) of Title 60, Oklahoma Statutes (1961); which provides:
'Where the interest of the beneficiary of a trust is subject to the exercise of discretion by the trustee or by another, the provisions of this Act as to the rights of creditors
and assignees shall apply with respect to any sums which
2 Foley v. Hastings, 107 Conn. 9, 139 Ad. 305 (1927); Funk v. Grulke,
204 Iowa 314, 213 N.W. 608 (1927); Todd's Bex'rs v. Todd, 260 Ky. 611, 86
S.W.2d 168 (1935); Calloway v. Smith, 300 Ky. 55, 186 S.W.2d 642 (1945).
3 Brahmey v. Rollins, 87 N.H. 290, 179 At. 186 (1935).
4 Roorda v. Roorda, 230 Iowa 1103, 300 N.W. 294 (1941).
5 "Notwithstanding a provision in the terms of a trust restraining the alienation of the interest of a beneficiary, such interest shall be entitled to be reached
in the satisfaction of claims to the following extent: 1. All income due or to accrue in the future to the beneficiary shall be subject to enforceable claims under
the laws of this State for, (a) support of a husband, wife, or child of the beneficiary, (b) necessary services rendered or necessary supplies furnished to the
beneficiary, or (c) a judgment based on any such claim under (a) or (b).
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the trustee of such person determines shall be paid to or
for the beneficiary.
In reading this subsection in conjunction with subsection A, it is evident
that the Legislature intended to limit the invasion of a discretionay trust
to the amount that a trustee of a discretionary trust might decide to pay
to the beneficiary. It should be noted that the Legislature made no mention in subsection E of making an exception of the specific claimants referred to in subsection A of said statute, specifically, a husband, wife, or
child of a beneficiary.
However, the rights of one making a will and the disposition made
thereby may be altered by statutory rule. If the statute permits a creditor
to reach the rights of a beneficiary under a trust, then a testator could not
prevent the rights of these creditors. But, such rights would be enforceable only as allowed by statute. It has been recognized in Oklahoma that
statutes restricting the right to make a will and to dispose of one's property will be strictly construed. 6
Thus, because the trustee bank in the FirstNational case was ordered
to pay a specific sum by the lower court before it had exercised its discretion, as provided for in the testatrix's will, there would be an invasion
of the trust estate contrary to the clear intent of the testarix and would
have the effect of preventing her from disposing of her property as expressed in her will. Because the bank had never exercised such discretion
in favor of the beneficiary, it could certainly not be compelled by the
court to satisfy the judgment of an outside creditor from the corpus or
income of the trust estate. This contention is based on an Oklahoma case
holding that courts have no power to control the individual's right to do
with his own property as he pleases by will if he possesses testamentary
capacity.7 It has also been determined that in construing a will, the intent
of the testator must be ascertained and given effect if such intent does
not attempt to effect something the law forbids.8 It is evident that the
testatrix did not violate any laws of the state when she created a discretionary trust because the Oklahoma statute itself recognizes trust of this
nature.Y
The lower court's opinion would have had the effect of directing said
trustee to make specific payments to the plaintiff prior to its determination of how much was to be paid to the beneficiary. This would put the
court in the position of exercising the trustee's discretion, thus ignoring
the basic principles of trust law as they apply to a discretionary trust. It
would be difficult to predict what effect a decision of this nature would
have had on future testamentary acts in Oklahoma. As it would be of
great importance to persons who execute wills, the Supreme Court, without a doubt, gave consideration to the far-reaching effects of its decision
and the basic fundamentals of trust law. It is also evident that the court
showed great consistency in view of its own past expressions upholding
0 Carothers v. Carothers, 196 Okla. 640, 167 P.2d 899, 906 (1946).
7 Parnacher v. Mount, 207 Okla. 275, 248 P.2d 1021 (1952).
8 Parnacher v. Hawkins, 203 Okla. 387, 222 P.2d 362 (1950).

9 60 OKLA. STAT. § 175.25(E) (1961).
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the expressed desires of a testator when his wishes are not contrary to the
laws of this state.
From the decision in this case, it can be presumed that the prevailing
rule is that when the beneficiary is given an enforceable intere6: in the
property devised, that interest may be subject to his debts to the extent
provided for by statute. When such an interest has been given and a
specific sum is directed to be paid to the beneficiary, the payment of this
sum can be legally enforced. An interest may also be subject to payment
of the beneficiary's debt when the language creating the interest is sufficient to give the beneficiary an interest in the property devised. But when
neither of these is given and the sum which he is to receive is discretionary with the trustee, no interest is created which may be subjected to the
payments of his debts until the trustee elects to use his discretion and
pay a certain sum to the beneficiary.
Timo;hy 1. Crowley
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